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Abstract
Dynamic pricing of retail electricity, as opposed to the widely applied average pricing,
has often been proposed to enhance economic efficiency through demand response. The
development of variable production from renewable energies and expectations about the
installation of heat pumps and electric vehicles have now reinforced interest in flexible
demand and dynamic pricing. With a roll-out of smart metering one important technical
hurdle is going to be cleared, and dynamic retail pricing may soon become an eligible
option for many households. We quantify the potential incentives to adopt new pricing
schemes using exemplary Danish data. Until now, limited activity of household con-
sumers on retail markets indicates that switching supplier or contract is perceived costly.
We apply the concept of switching costs to explain this hesitant behaviour, and use it to es-
timate a threshold level based on recent observations in the Danish market. We calculate
potential savings from dynamic pricing and show how the choice of electricity taxation
technique may hamper or enhance potential benefits. In the light of switching costs, our
results suggest that the combination of smart meter roll-out and dynamic pricing offer-
ings might be insufficient to convince the majority of households to switch contracts and
become active in response to prices, unless they hold a substantial flexibility potential.
Dynamic taxation, even if applied to parts of the levies, could contribute significantly to
induce flexible consumption.
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INTRODUCTION
Dynamic pricing of retail electricity has become a recurring item on the energy policy
agenda. If introduced instead of the ubiquitous average pricing, it generates economic
efficiency gains – assuming retail demand is price responsive.1 So far, however, technical
and administrative requirements as well as uncertainty about potential gains have pre-
vented implementation in many markets. Large-scale development of variable produc-
tion from renewable energies in Denmark has now reestablished an interest in flexible
demand and dynamic pricing.2,3 As the effectiveness of new pricing schemes depends
largely on individual decisions of households, this paper explores implications of dy-
namic electricity pricing in Denmark from a household consumer perspective. While
theoretical gains are mostly undisputed,4,5 it remains an open question whether electric-
ity retail customers find it attractive to adopt dynamic pricing schemes and responsive
behaviour.6,7
A certain flexibility potential is assumed to be present also in Danish households,8,9
and consumers are continuously equipped with smart meters.10 Some regulatory issues
regarding data access and settlement have thus far hindered the development of dynamic
price products.11 With the implementation of a data hub and new retail market rules,
though, all consumers in a foreseeable future should have the possibility to switch to
an hourly-varying price contract, both technically and in terms of access to competitive
products. This leaves us with the question of consumers’ potential financial benefits, pro-
viding an incentive to switch to dynamic rates and become responsive to varying prices.
To date the Danish retail price is dominated by fixed per-unit elements:12 payments for
grid use, fiscal levies and the para-fiscal public-service-obligation (PSO) levy that mainly
finances renewable energy support (see Figure 1). In effect, the payments for all levies
are directly proportionate to the volume of consumption. Even with dynamic pricing of
the purely market related part, relative variability becomes almost invisible to the con-
sumer. Analyses of retail electricity prices in Denmark thus must consider taxes. In order
to sustain the relative variations in the underlying market price and increase the incentive
for demand response under dynamic pricing, a changed dynamic approach to levies and
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taxes could become relevant.13,14 A few studies already assess the possibility of dynami-
cally linking the para-fiscal levy that finances renewable support in Germany to spot mar-
ket prices.15,16 In Denmark dynamic taxes and levies have gained some attention in the
debate as well.17,18 But while some new dynamic electricity tax structures based on mar-
ket indicators, such as the amount of wind power in the system, have been assessed,19 we
did not find any work exploring the details of value-based or ad-valorem taxation based
on the underlying electricity price.
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Figure 1: Danish household electricity price (4000 kWh/year) in 201320
The overall aim of our paper is to provide an indication of whether dynamic pric-
ing could be competitive as a product on the Danish retail electricity market taking into
account the possibility of consumers to respond to hourly prices in order to generate
benefits. Therefore we estimate potential benefits of consumers switching to a dynamic
pricing scheme under different assumptions of their ability to respond to prices. To gain
insight into the distribution of benefits among households we use disaggregated load
profiles for different types of homes. In our evaluation we take into account all elements
of the retail price including taxation. We also determine the gains of converting fixed per-
unit adders to the electricity price into dynamic elements and evaluate the impact on the
attractiveness of dynamic rates. This is done for both the fiscal levies (dynamic tax) and
for the public-service-obligation levy (dynamic PSO).
While any demand response optimisation would result in financial benefits, it is un-
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clear what level of benefits would actually be required to trigger adoption of dynamic
pricing and responsive behaviour. We do have information, though, about the behaviour
of household consumers on the Danish retail market. Based on this information we pro-
pose threshold levels and evaluate the attractiveness of dynamic pricing schemes as a
viable option to customers under retail competition.
Determining the attractiveness of dynamic pricing
Disaggregated hourly consumption data set
To account for heterogeneity of consumers we evaluate benefits on a disaggregated ba-
sis. Actual hourly metering data has been acquired on household or sub-station level for
Danish consumers in the period of 2007–2012. Information on electric heating is available
as well. Measurements are obtained by various network companies that report to the
Danish Energy Association (Dansk Energi) and the Danish transmission system operator
(Energinet.dk) on a regular basis. Information on the used data set is shown in Table 1. It
covers a total of 652 meters, many on a sub-station level. On average a metering point
covers around 14 individual households. In total the data set covers 9215 household cus-
tomers with an average consumption of 3941 kWh per year. To maintain comparability
between consumers the metering data for a connection point is scaled down according to
the number of households connected where necessary. Therefore the load-shift potential
of individual households in some cases is estimated by using the shape of the respective
sub-station profile.
Table 1: Used hourly consumption data set
Meters Consumers Consumption
per average share in share in
total total meter [kWh/y] used data 2013
Apartments 86 5,691 66.2 3,464 11.6% 24.4%
Semi-/detached houses 566 3,524 6.2 4,013 88.4% 75.6%
without electric heating 557 3,057 5.5 3,999 86.7% 62.5%
with electric heating 9 467 51.9 4,858 1.7% 13.1%
Total 652 9,215 14.1 3,941 100.0% 100.0%
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In Denmark residential consumption of electricity accounts for about 30% of total elec-
tricity consumption, the major share consumed in detached or semi-detached homes.21
Most commonly no electric heating is installed. The shares of consumption per category
in the used data are shown in Table 1 together with the actual shares in Denmark of 2013.
Due to its composition and the scaling of some profiles to household level, the used data
set is not fully representative of Danish residential consumption. In terms of total con-
sumers, apartments are overrepresented, but as we only use one profile per meter, this
category will eventually be slightly underrepresented in the final average results. The
results per category, however, are unaffected, and the data still provides a good basis to
estimate household-level effects of dynamic pricing.
Benefits from dynamic pricing
The incentive to adopt a new contract is approximated by simulating potential response
activities and resulting savings on individual customers’ electricity bills. Based on the
actual metering data the total annual electricity bill of a household is determined, at first,
by applying a traditional flat price per kWh that is adjusted every quarter of a year. This
is then compared to hourly pricing. All end-user prices include relevant levies and taxes
within the analysed time period and have been deflated to the level of 2012, the last year
in the used data set. In addition to applying the current per-unit taxation scheme we
also derive results adding dynamic, ad-valorem levies for both the fiscal and para-fiscal
elements. In all cases these are defined as a percentage such that they result in the same
annual revenues if consumers would not respond to prices.
For simplicity we use a stylised demand response model rather than estimates of
price-elasticity or models of specific appliances. Load shift occurs to the lowest priced
hours within predefined time slices. We restrict the shifting by assuming that consumers
will not reduce their demand below the lowest hourly consumption measured during one
full year. Moreover, we assume that the measured peak during one year represents the
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connected load of household appliances reduced by a coincidence factor (CF):
CF =
Peak load
Total connected load
(1)
Applying the factor to the peak load therefore gives us a theoretical maximum load
per household. A common approximation of the coincidence factor for different numbers
n of connected loads is given by:22
CF = 0.5
(
1 +
5
2n+ 3
)
(2)
For large numbers of connected loads of around 250 this approximation approaches
0.5. We use this number for the apartment category. Although a single apartment might
not have 250 loads connected, we want to account for that the used profiles actually cover
larger blocks of apartments. In this way, when scaled down to a single apartment, we
avoid underestimating the individual peak loads. For detached homes we use a slightly
higher factor of 0.55 assuming that fewer electrical loads are covered by the profiles (us-
ing equation (2) the value corresponds to around 23 loads). For customers with electric
heating we use a factor of 0.823.
In mathematical terms our approach is equivalent to the following simple optimisa-
tion problem:
min
d≥0
T∑
t=1
dtPt
s.t. dt ≥ mintD0t ∀ t ∈ T
1
CF maxtD
0
t ≥ dt ∀ t ∈ T
t+L−1∑
s=t
ds =
t+L−1∑
s=t
D0s ∀ { t ∈ T | t = L(m− 1) + 1,m ∈ Z+ }
(3)
We minimise costs given by multiplying the chosen demand level d with the end user
price P . The original metered consumption D0 determines upper and lower bounds of d
applying the principles described above. The last constraint ensures that load is shifted
and not just curtailed: within given time windows of length L the sum of load after shift-
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ing (d) needs to be equal to the sum of loads in the original profile (D0). We use windows
of 3, 6, 12, 24 and 168 hours to represent the potential load shift horizons. These time
slices cover the most important short-term patterns in hourly electricity prices. Moreover,
it may be assumed that the load-shift potential of a household customer is somewhat lim-
ited and would not exceed the maximum period of one whole week (i.e. 168 hours).
In order to estimate a savings potential we apply rather optimistic constraints. Deriv-
ing results for this kind of best-case scenario helps us to determine, whether a sufficient
economic incentive to adopt dynamic pricing can be expected, and consequently, whether
such options can be attractive on a liberalised retail market.
Threshold benefit levels of consumers
Several studies have investigated benefits of demand response under dynamic pricing.24–26
A number of these also estimate financial impacts on household consumers.27 We ar-
gue, though, that consumer benefits of demand response should not be seen in isolation.
Rather, they should be analysed with consumers’ adoption decisions in mind. Making
consumers actively participate will become one of the critical issues in the further de-
velopment of demand response under retail competition.28,29 We therefore analyse our
results in the context of observed behaviour in the liberalised Danish retail market.
Switching rates of 3–7% indicate that consumers in Denmark are mostly comfortable
with their suppliers and the prices they offer.30,31 For the largest share of consumers this
means they are buying electricity at traditional flat rate conditions.32 Potential savings of
switching from the traditional rate to competitive offers can be observed to be around 5–
10% – on average not more than €50 per year; for many customers this does not provide
a sufficient incentive. An offer that in addition would ask for the consumer to change
behaviour as a precondition to obtain savings (as in the case of load-shifting) would likely
require larger savings. For example, research in Germany has shown that consumers on
average expected savings of €54 per year (more than 5% of their total bill) from giving
access to automatic control of their fridges alone.33 A Swedish survey resulted in even
higher figures.34
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With homogeneous goods like electricity one should expect that small price differ-
ences would be sufficient to induce switching. In practice, we can see that this is not
the case. For households in particular, factors beyond the financial incentive do play
a role as previous research has found.35 A Dutch survey, for example, has shown that
autonomy, privacy and comfort are highly valued and that households may be very re-
luctant towards participating if these factors are compromised.36 The findings seem to be
supported by a Swiss experiment characterising only 20% of a sample of household con-
sumers as "price sensitive", whereas the remaining share focussed more on rate stability,
home automation and security.37 Furthermore, in a German study 69% of respondents
preferred a fixed rate to dynamic pricing as well.38
The observed switching behaviour as well as the above findings regarding household
consumer preferences suggest that potential benefits would need to outweigh a range of
intangible costs associated with switching to another supplier or pricing scheme.39 If we
could determine the cost of switching and compare it with the benefits of a dynamic rate,
then we would have an estimate of the required level of benefits from a consumer point of
view in order to switch to such new schemes. This is not easily measured, but fortunately
a simplified method to determine the cost of switching has already been developed.40 It
simply uses market shares and price differences observed for a homogeneous product in
the market, and has been applied previously, for example, in the context of electricity,41
internet providers42 or the airline industry.43
A dominant market position with deviating prices in this framework is explained by
switching costs. Switching cost SAB of supplier A’s customers switching to supplier B
with respective market shares M and prices p is defined as:
SAB = pA − MB pB
MA +MB
(4)
This expression results from the assumption that the observed prices of A and B are
chosen such that it is unattractive for any of the two suppliers – costs of switching taken
into account – to offer their product to the other supplier’s customers at sufficiently low
prices to switch. Supplier B would have to offer a price of pA minus SAB in order to
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convince A’s customers to switch. Switching costs may then be determined by observing
that the actual revenue of supplier B, pBMB, has to be more or at least equally attractive
to the revenue resulting from getting supplier A’s customers to switch, which is: (pA −
SAB)(MA +MB). Setting these two expressions equal and rearranging results in equation
(4).
The data on market shares of suppliers in Denmark that is required to determine the
above switching cost is not readily available. We therefore use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) for market concentration regularly published by the Danish transmission
system operator.44 The index is defined as:
HHI =
N∑
i=1
Mi
2 (5)
As the number of market participants is made public, we can approximate the market
share of the largest supplier M1 assuming that the remaining share is divided equally
amongst all other suppliers:
HHI =M21 + (N − 1)
(
1−M1
N − 1
)2
(6)
While 70 suppliers are active in Denmark in total, only a part of them supply cus-
tomers in the whole country. For the calculation of market shares we therefore define the
market to consist of 44 suppliers, which is the maximum number active in any distribu-
tion area. As traditionally consumers have been supplied by their local utility company,
we take into account the concentration index within local distribution areas, where the
weighted average HHI value lies at 0.7, resulting in an average 84% market share of the
largest supplier. Being with the largest supplier does not necessarily mean that customers
have not been active on the market by comparing prices or choosing new contracts. This
could be taken into account by using the share of consumers on a traditional fixed price
product as the incumbent market share instead of the one derived from the HHI. This
alternative value is around 55%.32
Switching costs are estimated by applying equation (4). We use the above incumbent
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market shares as MA and the combined share of all competitors as MB. As the incumbent
price we use average supply costs based on a traditional flat rate price, whereas for the
competitors we use the most attractive offers in the retail market: products with prices
fixed at the most for 6 months ahead. Resulting switching cost estimates are given in
Table 2. We use these benchmark levels below to evaluate estimated savings generated
by a switch to dynamic pricing under different tax regimes.
Table 2: Switching cost estimates
Incumbent Switching
share [-] cost [€]
Local HHI 84% 114
Fixed price share 55% 78
Results
Consumer benefits of dynamic pricing under different taxation schemes
Figure 2 shows resulting costs subdivided by price element. The top panel shows results
in the reference case of flat pricing. The other two panels show results for dynamic pric-
ing with and without a dynamic tax under different assumptions about the load-shifting
time window. As expected, larger windows reduce the supply cost for customers un-
der dynamic pricing, and the effect becomes even more pronounced with a dynamic tax
replacing the unit tax. Individual costs span a wide range from as low as €100 and up
to far above €2000 per year. To provide an indication of the distribution of costs among
households and consumer categories we use boxplots. In these, 50% of the results lie
within the boxes, and the bars are set to cover 95% of the results. The means are indicated
by different shapes per category and deviate from the median line, due to asymmetric
distributions in some of the results.
The average benefits of switching to another pricing scheme are summarised in Table
3 for different customer categories and in total. Horizontally the table shows potential
benefits from shifting load within the analysed time windows. The first section repre-
sents a switch from flat to dynamic pricing maintaining per-unit levies on electricity. The
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Table 3: Average benefits of switching to dynamic pricing under different taxation
schemes by load shift window
Load shift horizon
no resp. 3 hours 6 hours 12 hours 24 hours 168 hours
[€/y] [€/y] [€/y] [€/y] [€/y] [€/y]
Dynamic price
Apartments 36.8 53.3 69.0 89.8 118.9 168.5
Semi-/detached homes 32.4 51.0 68.2 90.3 118.3 169.9
without electric heating 32.1 50.5 67.6 89.5 117.4 169.0
with electric heating 41.9 68.7 89.4 117.3 145.8 198.1
All categories 34.1 51.9 68.5 90.1 118.5 169.4
net load-shift benefit - 17.8 34.5 56.1 84.5 135.3
Dynamic price and PSO
Apartments 36.9 58.8 79.5 106.6 144.4 210.0
Semi-/detached homes 32.4 57.1 79.9 109.0 145.6 215.0
without electric heating 32.4 56.7 79.4 108.3 144.8 214.1
with electric heating 32.7 68.6 96.1 133.0 170.8 242.4
All categories 34.1 57.8 79.7 108.1 145.2 213.1
net load-shift benefit - 23.7 45.7 74.0 111.1 179.0
Dynamic price and tax
Apartments 36.5 89.8 140.0 206.0 297.7 458.1
Semi-/detached homes 33.2 92.8 147.7 217.8 305.7 472.9
without electric heating 34.0 92.8 147.3 216.7 304.6 471.6
with electric heating 6.6 93.0 159.7 249.2 340.6 510.8
All categories 34.5 91.6 144.7 213.3 302.7 467.2
net load-shift benefit - 57.2 110.3 178.8 268.2 432.8
Dynamic price, PSO and tax
Apartments 36.6 95.3 150.4 222.8 323.2 499.7
Semi-/detached homes 33.1 98.8 159.3 236.4 333.0 517.9
without electric heating 34.3 99.0 159.1 235.5 332.0 516.8
with electric heating -2.6 92.9 166.5 264.9 365.6 554.0
All categories 34.5 97.5 155.9 231.3 329.3 511.0
net load-shift benefit - 63.0 121.5 196.8 294.8 476.6
remaining sections of Table 3 show the effects of introducing dynamic PSO payments and
taxes. There is an advantage to be gained by switching from the default product to an
hourly-price product even without load shifting (column ’no resp.’). This has to be kept
in mind when looking into the potential of demand response actions. Although signif-
icant benefits may be achieved in total, some of those will have to be attributed to the
mere effect of hourly pricing that for some part covers the implicit insurance premium
in a fixed price. As competition increases one may expect this gap to become smaller,
though. Therefore the last line in each section of Table 3 shows the net load-shift benefit
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that would be achievable even if the average level of flat and dynamic pricing would be
exactly the same.
It does not seem to play a large role in the average benefits whether the consumers
live in apartments or detached homes. Additional consumption from electric heating is
an advantage when it comes to load shifting. What cannot be seen from the presented
average figures is that the benefits are not equal in all years of the data set and electricity
bills may become more volatile with hourly pricing schemes. Electric heating customers
are particularly vulnerable to high prices during the heating season. Therefore dynamic
pricing holds a certain risk for these customers. If the dynamics are further increased
through taxation this may have adverse effects if customers with electric heating do not
react to prices properly.
Switching from static unit taxation to dynamic ad-valorem taxation would support
the incentive for demand response. Even when correcting for savings that result from the
mere switch between a flat and a dynamic electricity price, demand response generates
significant savings under dynamic taxation. In all of the simulated cases the load-shift
benefits under dynamic taxation are more than three times the amount achieved under
dynamic pricing with traditional taxation. Admittedly, a dynamic tax would be a rather
substantial intervention. Therefore we also analysed the option of a dynamic PSO pay-
ment, both as a separate instrument and in combination with a dynamic tax (see Table
3). Similar effects can be achieved by a dynamic PSO, though to a lesser degree. Benefits
would increase by more than 30% as compared to a fixed PSO payment under dynamic
pricing. Combining dynamic tax and PSO would yield the maximum incentive for load-
shifting with savings around 3.5 times those of dynamic pricing with fixed levies.
Attractiveness of pricing schemes
Considering the total average electricity bill of more than €1000 under flat pricing (see
Figure 2), demand response alone (after switching from a flat to a dynamic price) gen-
erates savings in a range of 2–10% of total costs. This is comparable to price differences
we have seen under retail competition in the past,32 but may still seem somewhat lim-
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ited considering the rather optimistic assumptions of our demand response simulation.
Dynamic taxation could increase results by a factor three, and such savings should make
it far more likely to motivate customers to switch contracts if we use today’s switching
behaviour as an indicator. We will have to return to our switching cost benchmarks, how-
ever, to further conclude whether such savings are sufficiently attractive or not.
Figure 3 shows distributions of cost savings under dynamic pricing for unit and dy-
namic tax regimes subject to optimal load shifting under the given constraints. The mean
levels for the three different residential consumer categories are indicated by vertical lines
of the same colour as the distribution. As benchmarks we show the two levels of switch-
ing costs from Table 2 as grey vertical bars. Moreover, we indicate gains that may be
obtained by a simple switch of supplier under current retail market conditions by a third
bar. A first thing to note is how differently an hourly pricing regime may affect customers.
Due to the different individual profiles some households are only able to achieve savings
in the low end. It may even be the case that certain customers lose on dynamic pricing.
Another small group of customers will profit substantially from variable pricing regimes.
The light blue distributions show savings under the present unit taxation. Without
any response, the level will lie at or around the observed savings from switching supplier
in the market. Although dynamic pricing provides benefits even without becoming flexi-
ble, it is unlikely that residential consumers would choose it with similarly attractive, but
more stable, options at hand. Adding flexibility, switching may become attractive; the
lower switching cost benchmark is exceeded at windows of 12 hours for all three con-
sumer categories. The higher switching cost level is exceeded with full flexibility within
24 hours. For most consumers such levels of flexibility can only be achieved for parts of
their consumption, so the simulated savings will be difficult to achieve in practice. With
dynamic taxation (dark blue lines and distributions) the lower switching cost benchmark
will be exceeded already by being flexible within 3-hour windows, while the high bench-
mark is exceeded at the 6-hour window for all categories. Taking into account the var-
ious behavioural constraints of households this seems more realistic. At the same time,
though, benefits are distributed throughout a wider range with both winners and losers
among the individual households.
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Figure 3: Simulated savings of different load shift simulations with unit and dynamic
taxation (total frequency distributions and consumer category means) comparing with
switching threshold values
Although the switching cost levels are somewhat hypothetical and very uncertain,
they indicate that pure dynamic pricing might be insufficient to convince customers of,
firstly, choosing a dynamically priced product and, subsequently, become active in re-
sponse to the variable prices. Introducing dynamic taxation on the other hand could help
to counteract the inertia of consumers and make them switch to dynamic pricing. But
also a less intrusive option like the dynamic PSO payment might be helpful. In Figure
4 we show the isolated effect of the dynamic PSO on the distribution of savings (note
the shortened horizontal scale). Although effects are smaller than for dynamic taxes, this
instrument would exceed the lower switching cost benchmark with 6-hour load shift-
ing windows as well, and could thus be a real alternative to the wide ranging dynamic
tax. The option seems particularly relevant with rising levels of the PSO payment to be
expected as renewable capacity is further increased.
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(total frequency distributions and consumer category means) comparing with switching
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Discussion
On liberalised electricity retail markets dynamic pricing offers have to compete against
other types of retail products. Despite of the high uncertainty in determining a level of
benefits that would be sufficient for consumers to switch to dynamic pricing, our simu-
lations show that substantial flexibility will be required from consumers to make savings
from dynamic pricing more attractive than other retail market options. Benefits com-
pensating for switching costs suggested by the applied model will be difficult to achieve
with simple dynamic pricing. Dynamic taxation, or even just a dynamic PSO payment,
has been shown to create an incentive exceeding switching costs at moderate levels of
flexibility.
The results are derived for Denmark, but are similarly relevant in other countries with
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high electricity taxes or payments for supported renewable generation. The rationale
behind the retail electricity tax system in Denmark to date is primarily to generate an
incentive to save energy and so reduce import dependency. This reaches back to the
energy crises of the 1970s.45 At that time the largest share of electricity was produced
from imported fossil fuels; so any unit of electricity saved had an immediate impact on
imports. A per-kWh tax thus was well suited to provide the right incentives. Add to that
the relatively limited elasticity of electricity demand in the short term, and the tax makes
for a reliable and efficient source of government income. With the introduction of more
and more low-carbon electricity production largely independent from fuel imports, the
energy savings argument might not be as straightforward anymore. In addition timing
of savings becomes more crucial in a wind-based system. Thus a dynamic electricity tax
seems like an elegant solution to increase the incentive for demand response if a potential
is present among consumers. It does, however, introduce a couple of questions as we will
discuss in the following.
A fiscal issue of, potentially, more unstable state revenues with dynamic taxes arises
from the fact that the tax income in a particular year is subject to uncertainty about both
market price and resulting customer responses. As the European Union prescribes a min-
imum level of electricity taxation, it might be necessary in Member States to account for
this in the overall design. Frequent adjustments of the tax rate could stabilise revenues.
While technically the problem seems manageable, politically this may pose a substantial
issue.46 Regarding the PSO levy similar issues in determining future revenues are preva-
lent in the current system as well: neither production volume, nor market price can be
predicted exactly. Currently the levy is adjusted on a quarterly basis; so a frequent ad-
justment of rates is common practice. If a dynamic tax rate would be kept stable or is
adjusted less frequently, we estimate annual variations in the range of 20-30%. By rate
adjustments it will be possible to keep revenue variations to a minimum.
From a welfare point of view it is essential to determine whether ad-valorem taxes
introduce higher or lower distortions as compared to unit taxes. It is well-established
theoretically that, in the case of fully competitive markets, unit and ad-valorem taxation
that generate the same revenue are equivalent in terms of distortions.47 In oligopolis-
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tic settings ad-valorem taxation may even have the advantage of lower consumer prices
than specific taxation raising the same amount of tax revenue.48 For electricity such con-
clusions would only hold on average while in the extreme situations of peak and off-peak
consumption revenues will differ between the two techniques of taxation. Eventually,
the distortive effect depends on the shape of demand and supply curves, and we cannot
at this point conclude which one of the taxation techniques would result in fewer dead-
weight losses in the Danish retail market. As long as market mechanisms are missing that
adequately address the flexibility potential of small-scale actors, a dynamic tax could as
well be justified, if flexible household consumers enable the integration of intermittent
production from renewable energies and thus provide environmental benefits.
A more political question is the distributional effect: if the total amount of tax income
is to remain stable, then benefits for active customers will become a burden for passive
customers. Moreover, distributions of results among individual consumers show that
some will have better opportunities than others for participating in demand response ac-
tivities. It would be worth investigating if certain characteristics beyond the categories we
apply determine achievable benefits. This could provide the possibility of more targeted
measures. Potentially, high income households that do have the resources to invest in,
e.g., automation equipment would be likely to benefit more than others.49 On the other
hand even if low-income customers remain passive, they could benefit from an overall
price reduction as a result of demand response from active customers.50
The competitiveness of dynamic pricing will change over time, as price patterns de-
velop more in favour of flexible loads with increasing shares of intermittent generation.
In the future with even higher shares of production from wind energy we expect to see
a significant increase in potential savings if price volatility increases accordingly. The
impact of wind on prices in scenarios up to 2035 is noticeable,51 and should lead to an
increased interest in demand response. Another potential driver of benefits could be the
development of dynamic distribution grid charges to reflect local congestions.52
In order to prepare for a future situation with a high demand for flexibility, however,
it could still be useful to implement additional incentives early on. Our analysis shows
that dynamic taxation of electricity certainly is an instrument that adds to the incentive
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of adopting demand response. Savings could increase by a factor three or more for those
customers that respond to prices. In combination with a smart meter roll-out and hourly
pricing schemes dynamic taxation should be a feasible option to initiate the development
of active demand response at household level; especially if substantial adoption of dy-
namic pricing is to be established before we see noteworthy market price impacts from
large-scale renewable generation. If desired, an incentive structure like this could even be
gradually phased out again in later years, with variations in energy prices increasing.
CONCLUSIONS
We have analysed the incentives for household demand response under hourly pricing
schemes by calculating potential savings of individual households on their overall elec-
tricity bill. The reluctant switching behaviour of household consumers in the Danish
retail market indicates that switching supplier or contract is perceived costly. We apply
switching costs as a concept to explain the lack of switching, and calculate an estimate
using recent observations in Danish retail competition. Accounting for such intangible
costs, our results suggest that a combination of smart meter roll-out and the offering of
dynamic pricing schemes might be insufficient to convince the average household con-
sumers to switch contracts and become active in response to prices unless they hold a
substantial flexibility potential. Distributions of benefits among individual customers,
however, show that even if on average the results are only moderately attractive, a dy-
namic pricing scheme could still have success amongst a smaller group of customers.
Furthermore, our results show that dynamic taxation can help to activate flexible de-
mand on a larger scale. Maintaining the relative effect of hourly price variations after
taxes, increases the incentive to respond by a factor three in a Danish setting. Such a
change in taxation technique, thus, makes it more likely that customers will switch their
supplier and enter into demand-response activities. The issue of varying state revenues
could be solved by annual or even quarterly rate adjustments. Distributional and welfare
effects remain to be analysed in detail.
It could be an option to introduce an ad-valorem rate only for parts of the electricity
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levies and taxes. Keeping in mind the positive effect of the expected demand response
on the integration of renewable production, it may be appropriate to apply dynamic rates
only to those elements related to renewable sources (i.e. the so called PSO levy in Den-
mark). Although effects are smaller, our results suggest that a dynamic PSO payment
might be just sufficient to surmount an optimistic estimate of switching costs.
From a policy perspective a gradual approach to encourage dynamic retail pricing
seems recommendable. As soon as settlement based on dynamic pricing becomes prac-
tically possible in the market, contract offers by suppliers and their respective adoption
by consumers should be examined. If adoption lags behind expectation, it should be con-
sidered to introduce dynamics within a share of the electricity levies. As of now, the PSO
payment seems to be an obvious starting point, but that could change at a later point. As
all stakeholders gain experience, further adoption may be induced by introducing the full
dynamic tax. During the time such a dynamic system is in place, the market development
should be closely monitored. If at some point market prices would provide sufficient sig-
nals in support of demand response, commencing a gradual phase-out of the dynamic
tax would be possible.
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